Twenty-six million people are living with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa; epidemics are widely dispersed, due to high levels of mobility. However, global elimination strategies do not consider mobility. We use Call Detail Records from 9 billion calls/texts to model mobility in Namibia; we quantify the epidemic-level impact by using a mathematical framework based on spatial networks. We find complex networks of risk flows dispersed risk countrywide: increasing the risk of acquiring HIV in some areas, decreasing it in others. Overall, 40% of risk was mobility-driven. Networks contained multiple risk hubs. All constituencies (administrative units) imported and exported risk, to varying degrees. A few exported very high levels of risk: their residents infected many residents of other constituencies. Notably, prevalence in the constituency exporting the most risk was below average. Large-scale networks of mobility-driven risk flows underlie generalized HIV epidemics in sub-Saharan Africa. In order to eliminate HIV, it is likely to become increasingly important to implement innovative control strategies that focus on disrupting risk flows.

Background

On March 17, 2020, French authorities implemented a nationwide lockdown to respond to the COVID-19 epidemic and curb the surge of patients requiring critical care. Assessing the effect of lockdown on individual displacements is essential to quantify achievable mobility reductions and identify the factors driving the changes in social dynamics that affected viral diffusion. We aimed to use mobile phone data to study how mobility in France changed before and during lockdown, breaking down our findings by trip distance, user age and residency, and time of day, and analysing regional data and spatial heterogeneities.

Methods

For this population-based study, we used temporally resolved travel flows among 1436 administrative areas of mainland France reconstructed from mobile phone trajectories. Data were stratified by age class (younger than 18 years, 18–64 years, and 65 years or older). We distinguished between residents and non-residents and used population data and regional socioeconomic indicators from the French National Statistical Institute. We measured mobility changes before and during lockdown at both local and country scales using a case-crossover framework. We analysed all trips combined and trips longer than 100 km (termed long trips), and separated trips by daytime or night-time, weekdays or weekends, and rush hours.

Findings

Lockdown caused a 65% reduction in the countrywide number of displacements (from about 57 million to about 20 million trips per day) and was particularly effective in reducing work-related short-range mobility, especially during rush hour, and long trips. Geographical heterogeneities showed anomalous increases in long-range movements even before lockdown announcement that were tightly localised in space. During lockdown, mobility drops were unevenly distributed across regions (eg, Île-de-France, the region of Paris, went from 585 000 to 117 000 outgoing trips per day). They were strongly associated with active populations, workers employed in sectors highly affected by lockdown, and number of hospitalisations per region, and moderately associated with the socioeconomic level of the regions. Major cities largely shrank their pattern of connectivity, reducing it mainly to short-range commuting (95% of traffic leaving Paris was contained in a 201 km radius before lockdown, which was reduced to 29 km during lockdown).

Interpretation

Lockdown was effective in reducing population mobility across scales. Caution should be taken in the timing of policy announcements and implementation, because anomalous mobility followed policy announcements, which might act as seeding events. Conversely, risk aversion might be beneficial in further decreasing mobility in highly affected regions. We also identified socioeconomic and demographic constraints to the efficacy of restrictions. The unveiled links between geography, demography, and timing of the response to mobility restrictions might help to design interventions that minimise invasiveness while contributing to the current epidemic response.

Background

The novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) epidemic has spread from China to 25 countries. Local cycles of transmission have already occurred in 12 countries after case importation. In Africa, Egypt has so far confirmed one case. The management and control of COVID-19 importations heavily rely on a country's health capacity. Here we evaluate the preparedness and vulnerability of African countries against their risk of importation of COVID-19.

Methods

We used data on the volume of air travel departing from airports in the infected provinces in China and directed to Africa to estimate the risk of importation per country. We determined the country's capacity to detect and respond to cases with two indicators: preparedness, using the WHO International Health Regulations Monitoring and Evaluation Framework; and vulnerability, using the Infectious Disease Vulnerability Index. Countries were clustered according to the Chinese regions contributing most to their risk.

Findings

Countries with the highest importation risk (ie, Egypt, Algeria, and South Africa) have moderate to high capacity to respond to outbreaks. Countries at moderate risk (ie, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, Angola, Tanzania, Ghana, and Kenya) have variable capacity and high vulnerability. We identified three clusters of countries that share the same exposure to the risk originating from the provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, and the city of Beijing, respectively.

Interpretation

Many countries in Africa are stepping up their preparedness to detect and cope with COVID-19 importations. Resources, intensified surveillance, and capacity building should be urgently prioritised in countries with moderate risk that might be ill-prepared to detect imported cases and to limit onward transmission.

The time variation of contacts in a networked system may fundamentally alter the properties of spreading processes and affect the condition for large-scale propagation, as encoded in the epidemic threshold. Despite the great interest in the problem for the physics, applied mathematics, computer science, and epidemiology communities, a full theoretical understanding is still missing and currently limited to the cases where the time-scale separation holds between spreading and network dynamics or to specific temporal network models. We consider a Markov chain description of the susceptible-infectious-susceptible process on an arbitrary temporal network. By adopting a multilayer perspective, we develop a general analytical derivation of the epidemic threshold in terms of the spectral radius of a matrix that encodes both network structure and disease dynamics. The accuracy of the approach is confirmed on a set of temporal models and empirical networks and against numerical results. In addition, we explore how the threshold changes when varying the overall time of observation of the temporal network, so as to provide insights on the optimal time window for data collection of empirical temporal networked systems. Our framework is of both fundamental and practical interest, as it offers novel understanding of the interplay between temporal networks and spreading dynamics.